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PERSONNEL TRANSFORMATION -CONSOLIDATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HUMAN RESOURCE SYSTEM INTO A JOINT SYSTEM

BACKGROUND
The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of redefining how it operates which includes managing the personnel required to perform DOD missions. This was caused by the end of the Cold War, the current Global War on Terrorism and the expected future resource constraints to man units and systems which have brought about this need for inner reflection.
Resolution of this important issue is crucial to ensuring the strategic objective of defending the homeland is met in the ongoing transformation process.
The circumstances and timing warrant consideration of combining the Army, Air Force, USJFCOM is the appropriate command to execute this mission since it is the designated DOD joint force provider to the Combatant Commanders. Although the current system under Title 10 of tasking services to resource missions basically works, it requires considerable coordination, time and effort to get the right personnel for the mission. By having one Joint
Human Resource System, DOD could streamline the manning and management process thereby enabling enhanced support to the Combatant Commanders. 1 USJFCOM is also the DOD command tasked for force transformation which would place the Human Resource System consolidation into its area of responsibility. Implementing this proposal would require amending Title 10, subtitles B thru E regarding service secretaries' appointed duties of manning the force.
Coordination with the DOD Transformation Office confirmed that their office is not currently looking at consolidation of the services' Human Resources Systems. The services' cultural differences, focus on operational force issues, and DOD's reliance on the services to work internal manpower requirements, preclude placing limited DOD manpower to research this area. However, the DOD point of contact did concur that consolidation will probably occur within the next 15-20 years as the force becomes more joint. 2 As such, one of the recommendations in this paper is to have DOD research the feasibility of combining the services Human Resource Systems within the next few years. organize forces and establish reserves of manpower for the defense of the nation. 5 The management of these programs relies on each of the services to maintain their own human resource organization to carry out their mission for the Secretary of Defense. These organizations were created when the services were first formed and have expanded with the services increase in size and complexity over the years. This resulted in stove-piped human resource systems which developed their own management programs for evaluations, promotions, assignments, awards, schools, etc. Although they are operational for their specific service, they were never designed to operate in today's joint environment where the services are integrated in the fight.
STATUS QUO
WHY SHOULD DOD TRANSFORM
The Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, has recognized the need to review the current organization of the Department of Defense to ensure that it meets the strategic goals of the nation. He stated recently that we are fighting a 21 st century global war on terror with management and personnel systems dating back to the Cold War and earlier.
Our enemy is flexible with the ability to leverage technology, transfer money across boundaries, purchase the latest weapons, and shift people at a moments notice. We cannot afford to keep bureaucratic processes of the industrial age if we wish to succeed in the information age. We must transform the way we recruit, retain and manage our workforce. at hand to improve our national security institutions. 9 The key to these findings is increased integration and management of national level agencies to include DOD.
The DOD Director of Transformation, Retired Navy Admiral Art Cebrowski, remarked that we must change not simply to make changes, but to remain capable of performing new required missions. 10 Network-centric operations is one of his top five goals and a hot area which requires new kinds of joint forces that are more expeditionary, more lethal, and able to leverage the intelligence gathering and communication assets available to our forces more efficiently.
This often requires working with other services that operate the unmanned aerial vehicles, the unmanned undersea vehicles and the robotics, which provide the crucial intelligence. 11 Thus, when looking at the national system, DOD must have a vision of working together across the military services and agencies to complete the mission.
Based on the comments by the 9/11 Commission, the NSS and the Secretary of Defense, as well as Congress' concern that DOD lacks the personnel to man U.S. operational commitments, it is questionable that the current national policy for managing the force is tailored to meet current and future strategic requirements. 12 DOD is currently looking at converting 320,000 uniformed people performing non-military jobs as part of the solution but this will be a slow process. 13 Congress' concern in this area resulted in increasing the manning of DOD by 30,000 personnel in the last defense authorization bill based on the perceived manning shortfalls as evident by the increasing OPTEMPO rates and the significant use of reserve forces. 14 While this may seem good for the services, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General
Schoomaker, is concerned that without additional congressional funding, programs must be cut to pay the bill. Roughly five procurement dollars would be cut for every personnel dollar added to the service. example of consolidation success that combines some of the services' logistics programs to enhance efforts in that arena. Creation of these agencies has not completely eliminated the services' from performing functions in their respective areas, but they have taken on the bulk of the mission through consolidation which enhances DOD and joint operations. Solutions are available as discussed in the external reviews, proposals and recommendations in this paper that would preclude increasing personnel strength and its associated costs.
EXTERNAL REVIEWS AND PROPOSALS
The issue of how to balance joint and service interests was directly addressed in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. There were nine objectives that the drafters used to build the legislation:
• Strengthen civilian authority
• Improve military advice to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council
• Place clear responsibilities on the unified commanders in chief for mission accomplishment
• Ensure that a unified commander's authority is commensurate with his responsibilities
• Increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning
• Provide for the more efficient use of resources
• Improve joint officer management
• Enhance the effectiveness of military operations
• Improve Defense Department management and administration 16 The result of this legislation's implementation has been overwhelming operational success on the battlefield from Operation Just Cause in Panama to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Looking at how DOD operates, it is extremely difficult to find a major deployment or action that is not joint.
Unfortunately, DOD has yet to reach all the benefits associated with the intent of the law. Joint officer management has not reached the levels expected nor has significant improvement occurred in defense management and administration according to James Locher in his analysis of the legislation's results.
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A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) March 2004 study also concluded that significant reforms are required to meet the challenges of a new strategic era. Overall, they found that DOD needs to maintain the viability of the military services but jointness must be extended to enhance interagency and coalition operations. 18 The study maintained the premise that defense resources should continue to be organized along service lines.
One recommendation that came out of the study is based on the need for only one reduce the annual outflow of officers from the services to fill joint billets. At first, the significance would not be realized, but once established, this core of joint professionals would reduce by two-thirds the demand for the services to provide officers on an annual basis. Finally, the current system has failed to provide the innately joint officers the Secretary of Defense is looking for or Goldwater-Nichols I intended. This is primarily caused by flaws in managing the program, lack of repetitive assignments, and a commitment to joint operations over service rivalry. 22 The key is making changes while DOD focuses on transformation and restructuring the organization to meet future requirements. Even though Dr Snider would limit joint professionals to the field grades and above, his premise and supporting arguments are useful for creating a joint human resources professional that would be the basis for working human resource actions for DOD in a joint environment. These professionals would possess the expert knowledge associated from working consistently in the joint arena, reduce inter-service rivalry through having one human resource system, and meet the intent of Congress for jointness.
TRANSFORMATION OF THE SERVICES INTO A JOINT FORCE
Fortunately, the Department of Defense has already begun transforming the military to fit the enhanced information age warfare required to meet current and projected challenges. DOD is undergoing an enormous transformation, which incorporates a significant change in the new generation of more capable ships which requires less maintenance and needs fewer but higher skilled personnel to operate. The DOD Transformation Chief is concerned in this area that the U.S. is not growing the scientists, mathematicians and other skilled professionals needed for DOD to leverage information age technology and man the critical positions. 25 The Navy is also pursuing replacing non-military essential personnel with civilians and contractors, which frees up funds and manpower for transformation. 26 The common denominator for all the services' transformation programs is an increase in expertise required, smaller and more adaptable organizations, leveraging technology, greater reliance on contractors to perform certain activities and increased operations in a joint 
DOD CIVILIAN MANAGEMENT
The DOD civilian workforce, which comprises approximately 700,000 personnel, is a critical piece of the human resource system. 28 The Government Accounting Office (GAO)
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce and the District of Columbia, examined the current transformation of the federal government to determine if it was pursuing a strategic approach to human capital management. The GAO study focused on four areas: conducting strategic workforce planning, strengthening federal employee training and development, implementing pay for performance, and creating strategic human capital offices. All of these are important to the overall program, but the key to integrating civilians into the strategic solution is the first: conducting strategic workforce planning. 29 During the 1990s, downsizing caused the civilian workforce to become unbalanced in terms of skill, age, and location. This severely affected a leader's ability to properly man the force to meet changing missions. Secretary Rumsfeld used the following point to illustrate how an improper mix of skills and bureaucracy in deploying civilians impacted on DOD civilian support for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). When looking at all civilians deployed for OIF, approximately 83% were contractors, while only 17% were DOD civilians. The reason for the fewer DOD civilians on the ground was primarily due to problems with assignment procedures for deploying civilian personnel. This challenge, combined with obsolete rules, pay problem issues, and promotion inflexibility is directly impacting on DOD's ability to get the best personnel into the most critical positions. This problem will increase with the aging of baby-boomers who comprise 50% of the workforce and are expected to retire in the next five years taking their experience and expertise with them. 30 DOD and GAO feel the recently approved funding for development of a National Security
Personnel System (NSPS) will fix many of the current problems in this area. The NSPS will allow for greater flexibility in recruiting, assigning, compensating, and managing DOD civilians.
NSPS should allow DOD to obtain the right mix of personnel at the right time. 31 The Secretary of Defense is also looking at the NSPS to enhance his ability to transform approximately 320,000
military positions into non-military jobs. 32 DOD's efforts in this area along with the Homeland Security system which is similar, has the potential to change the entire civil service system.
Regardless, it will certainly be the template for change within the government. 33 This new civilian personnel system should enable human resource managers to place the best qualified person in the position based on greater integration within the civil service system.
In order to see the benefits from the new system, GAO has recommended that DOD address the following shortfalls in its strategic workforce plan:
• Analyze and document the gaps between current and critical skills and competencies and those needed for the future workforce.
• Develop workforce strategies to fill the identified skills and competency gaps.
• Establish results-oriented performance measures to use in evaluating workforce planning efforts. 34 Currently, all of the services have not developed tools to collect, measure and store the data above which is needed to design workforce strategies to accomplish future DOD missions. 35 One solution is consolidating the services' civilian human resource activities with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness which would provide unity of effort in managing the civilian workforce.
INTEGRATION OF CONTRACTORS
Contractors are becoming a critical force multiplier within DOD across a vast array of programs which impact on the strategic manning of DOD. Three primary factors have led to the growth of contractors within DOD: force reductions, the need for initial and lifetime support for high-tech weapons, and increased outsourcing and privatization of former military functions. 36 "In contingency operations since 1990, DOD has relied extensively on logistics support contractors to provide many of the supplies and services needed by deployed U.S. forces." 37 The significance of this change in operating cannot be overstated and impacts human resource programs such as accountability. The Focused Logistics Warfighting (FLOW), under Joint Staff J4 oversight, prepared a draft DOD directive to establish strategic level guidance for managing contractors in joint operations. 38 The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is DOD's agency responsible for coordinating personnel service contracts and ensuring correct service support, integration and management are included in the contract. 39 The DCMA is not currently coordinating with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness to ensure DOD has the necessary human resource concerns in the contract. This is a concern, since DOD relies on contractors to fill former military personnel requirements which are making contractors essential to completing the mission. As such, DOD should establish coordination with DCMA and the appropriate DOD Human Resource agency to ensure compliance with the above issues.
CORE MILITARY SERVICE COMPONENT HUMAN RESOURCE FUNCTIONS
Listed below are the human resource responsibilities per DOD Directive 5100.1, which each of the services is currently tasked to accomplish in its force provider role:
• Prepare forces and establish reserves of manpower for the effective prosecution of war and military operations other than war and plan for the expansion of peacetime components to meet the needs of war.
• Maintain in readiness mobile reserve forces, properly organized and trained for employment in an emergency.
• Recruit, organize and train interoperable forces for assignment to combatant commanders.
• Assist each other in the accomplishment of their respective functions including the provisions of personnel and services. 40 The result is considerable duplication of effort within DOD in managing military human resource areas. Currently, each service has a separate human resource center which manages its forces (Army Human Resource Command, Navy Personnel Command, and Air Force Personnel Center). These organizations manage the same human resource areas listed below:
• assignments
• promotions
• evaluations
• retirements and separations Program. Personal experience with the Army assignment system resulted in selecting, requesting and receiving a follow-on assignment through the internet web site without ever speaking with an assignment manager. This is a significant change to the time intensive way the services operated in the past. In each case, the difference is not so much the system but how the service member is assisted on the other end by the assignment manager.
Two other key consolidation areas of concern for many military leaders are promotions and evaluations. The significant difference for promotions is within the enlisted ranks where the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps have testing requirements prior to advancement as a noncommissioned officer where the Army does not. However, the Army is again reviewing the possibility of testing similar to the old Skills Qualification Test (SQT). All service officer systems have a central selection process that focuses on similar areas of performance, leadership, stratification and potential. They are also based on requirements for each officer specialty.
Each service is required to follow Title 10 U.S. Code, which incorporates the Defense Officer
Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) and the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) as well as joint guidance when selecting officers for promotion. 43 This is completed through each service's Secretariat for Selection Boards, which are very similar in operation.
The evaluation system presents a more complex issue for consolidation due to cultural influence and diversity of forms. This area would require the most effort to overcome current service cultural biases on what should be emphasized for success. Currently, each service has their own evaluation report design; however, each one covers performance, character/personal traits and potential over a specified time period for both officers and non-commissioned officers.
The Army has the fewest number of forms with one for officers and one for enlisted members.
The Air Force is on the other end of the scale with six reports covering general officers to technical sergeants. In order to enhance efficiency, the services need to agree and establish DOD evaluation forms for officers and NCOs which will enable evaluators and personnel managers to process the forms without service specific training. These forms would replace the current separate service evaluation forms. A joint database would enhance tracking evaluations across the services.
DEFENSE INTEGRATED MILITARY HUMAN RESOURCES SYSTEM (DIMHRS)
In order to provide human resource support to Combatant Commanders who operate in the joint arena, the Secretary of Defense convened the 1995 Defense Science task force on
Military Personnel Information Management to advise him on the best strategy for supporting military personnel and pay functions. The outcome recommended creation of an integrated automated system which would fix functional shortfalls, and reduce excessive development and maintenance costs within DOD. This resulted in a congressionally mandated and funded system which allows the services to operate one integrated Human Resource system that provides the services, including the reserve components with the following capabilities:
• Accurate and timely data on personnel assets
• Standard data for comparison across Services and Components
• Properly track Reservists for both pay and service credit
• Tracking of all military personnel into and around the theater
• Integrated personnel and pay functions 44 The success of DIMHRS will provide the technological capability to combine the military services human resource commands into one organization. The common operating principles The next phase is establishment of a joint human resource management organization to work human resource programs once evaluation forms can be standardized. Assignment, promotion, casualty, awards and other core functions require minimum changes to standardize them across the services. Ideally, to maximize resources, the services' human resource commands should be consolidated at one location under the USJFCOM J1 which should be the FOA for the DOD J1 and OSD. However, based on current technology, this is not a requirement for consolidation since the appropriate service Human Resource command and control slice could be merged under the USJFCOM J1 to begin initial operations within the next few years. This would increase the short term burden on the J1 until the new structure, equipment and personnel could be placed under USJFCOM to accomplish the mission.
Consolidation of the human resource managers could occur as the services become more joint and begin managing personnel by function (i.e. joint aviation, land warrior, joint logistics, etc.). To ensure Title 10 service force provider roles are maintained initially, an HR Deputy, J1
for each service could be moved under the USJFCOM J1 until Title 10 can be changed to reflect the new joint environment. Their function would include management oversight of service specific assignments until DOD becomes a more joint force. Eliminating redundant service command and control, personnel managers and other resources as a result of consolidation could be returned to DOD to increase operational capabilities.
Although each of the services are revising how they perform human resource management through internal measures, integrating the four service systems into one DOD joint system could result in better management and execution of DOD human resources. As such, the final recommendation is for the DOD Transformation Office to research the feasibility of consolidating the services Human Resource Systems into a DOD joint system as described above.
CONCERNS
These recommendations may appear drastic and challenging to implement because service chiefs will be reluctant to give up their Title 10 force provider role to a joint agency, cultural differences among the services are difficult to overcome, and the current service human resource systems appear to work.
Goldwater-Nichols forced the services to increase jointness with favorable results in the operations arena. The 9/11 Commission findings and congressional pressure are forcing the national level intelligence agencies to integrate to combat global terrorism. Having a joint human resource agency as the force provider could enhance managing the force as DOD becomes more joint. A joint human resource system could ease migration across the services to fill critical positions, allow recruiting and retention managers with more placement options, streamline personnel actions in joint operations and still provide oversight of the system by the service chiefs in their Joint Chiefs of Staff role.
Historically, each service operates based on their service specific culture and this fact will remain constant. The real issue is not changing service culture but limiting its impact on common documents and practices across the services. For instance, cultural influence for evaluations and promotions can be resolved through leader education, board guidance and requirements (Air Force pilot competes against the same, Navy Line Officer against same, etc).
The key is adopting standardized forms and practices which joint human resource managers and service leaders can utilize as tools in managing the force.
Therefore, even though the current service human resource systems are functional, could they be more efficient if combined into one integrated DOD system so we can train as we fight?
Would DOD be as joint and effective if not for Congress mandating increased integration within DOD?
CONCLUSION
Our senior government officials demonstrate it is necessary to transform DOD to meet the management challenges of this century and beyond. Changes being worked will improve how DOD manages the total mix of military, civilians and contractors required in accomplishing DOD's global mission. However, additional work is required to ensure the right management practices are in effect as DOD develops the National Security Personnel System, creates and implements DIMHRs, increases the use of contractors, and is forced to reduce the number of military members working outside the operations arena. Implementation of these recommendations will assist DOD in becoming more capable in the human resource arena and will result in developing a joint human resource system needed to support our national military strategy.
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